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37 
THE RULE OF LAW AND THE PERILS OF 
PRECEDENT 
Randy J. Kozel* 
Introduction 
In a world where circumstances never changed and where every judicial 
decision was unassailably correct, applying the doctrine of stare decisis 
would be a breeze. Fidelity to precedent and commitment to sound legal 
interpretation would meld into a single, coherent enterprise. That world, 
alas, is not the one we live in. Like so much else in law, the concept of stare 
decisis encompasses a series of trade-offs—and difficult ones at that. 
Prominent among them is the tension between allowing past decisions to 
remain settled and establishing a body of legal rules that is flexible enough 
to adapt and improve over time.1 
Notwithstanding pervasive disagreement over the application of stare 
decisis to particular disputes, the doctrine is well established in American 
jurisprudence.2 Indeed, the Supreme Court has gone so far as to describe 
stare decisis as indispensable to the rule of law.3 But as Jeremy Waldron 
skillfully reminds us, justifying the doctrine requires more than platitudes.4 
Even a proposition as fundamental and seemingly intuitive as the ability of 
stare decisis to promote the rule of law conceals a considerable amount of 
analytical nuance. Professor Waldron concentrates on developing what we 
might think of as the rule-of-law case for precedent. Central to his project is 
the recognition that rule-of-law benefits arise at several distinct points along 
the path from initial ruling to subsequent application. The touchstone is the 
 
       *  Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. Thanks to Richard Garnett, 
Bruce Huber, and Jeff Pojanowski for helpful comments. 
 1. For some further thoughts on this tension in the realm of constitutional law, see 
Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right: Constitutional Method and the Path of Precedent, 91 
Tex. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2109419. 
 2. For notable exceptions, see, for example, Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically 
Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 Const. Comm. 289 (2005); Gary Lawson, The 
Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 23 (1994). 
 3. See Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478–79 
(1987). 
 4. Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111 
Mich. L. Rev. 1 (2012). 
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principle of “generality,” pursuant to which individual jurists subjugate their 
personal beliefs to the vision of a unified court working across space and 
time to fashion generally applicable norms.5 
In this Essay, I wish to build on Professor Waldron’s thoughtful analysis 
by saying something more about the other side of stare decisis. The rule-of-
law benefits of stare decisis are invariably accompanied by rule-of-law costs. 
In light of those costs, the ultimate question is not whether there are ways in 
which stare decisis promotes the rule of law. Rather, it is whether stare 
decisis advances the rule of law on net. Some departures from precedent can 
promote the rule of law, and some reaffirmances can impair it. Even if the 
rule of law were the only value that mattered, excessive fidelity to flawed 
precedents would be cause for concern.6 That rule-of-law ambivalence, I will 
suggest, should be brought to bear in calibrating the strength of deference 
that judicial precedents receive. 
I. The Rule-of-Law Case for Precedent 
In constructing his operating definition of the rule of law, Professor 
Waldron emphasizes the generality principle. Briefly stated, generality 
entails making legal decisions by developing and announcing general rules 
whose application extends beyond the case at hand. This is not simply a 
matter of treating like cases alike; the requirement of generality goes further, 
“command[ing] judges to work together to articulate, establish, and follow 
legal norms.”7 
To examine the mechanisms by which stare decisis fosters generality 
and contributes to the rule of law, Professor Waldron divides the 
adjudicative process into distinct layers. The bottom layer involves the 
“Precedent Judge,” who is initially called upon to resolve a dispute. The 
requirement of generality compels the Precedent Judge to approach the case 
before her as an instantiation of a broader problem. She must resolve the 
case by reference to a general rule that will carry over into the future.8 In 
discharging this duty, the Precedent Judge acts as if she is both deciding a 
concrete dispute and setting a precedent. Professor Waldron helpfully notes 
 
 5. Id. at 18. 
 6. For purposes of this Essay, I employ the terms “precedent” and “stare decisis” 
interchangeably to refer to a subsequent court’s practice of according deference to the court’s 
own past decisions. 
 7. Waldron, supra note 4, at 4. 
 8. To the extent we might have concerns about this type of judicial mentality as 
venturing beyond the case or controversy presented for decision, it is worth recalling Larry 
Alexander’s reminder that “[a]ll rules resolve issues not before the court.” Larry Alexander, 
Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 25 (1989). 
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that the Precedent Judge’s mandate of generality does not depend on any 
subsequent decisionmaker’s actually according respect to her decision. To 
the contrary, the Precedent Judge’s obligation is the same regardless of what 
the future may hold.9 But within a system that recognizes judicial precedents 
as meaningful, the Precedent Judge also sets the tone for later adjudication 
by establishing the general norm that will serve as the guiding framework 
for subsequent jurists.10 
The onward march of time inevitably brings the march of more 
aggrieved litigants into the courts. As it does, Professor Waldron leads us 
through additional layers of the rule-of-law case for stare decisis. These 
upper layers relate to the actions of the “Subsequent Judge,” who determines 
how to apply past decisions to a new dispute. The norm of generality 
remains crucial. The Subsequent Judge must imagine herself as working 
alongside the Precedent Judge to decide cases according to a generally 
applicable rule.11 Of course, any such rule must resolve the dispute that is 
pending before the Subsequent Judge by reference to a broader framework 
that extends across cases; after all, today’s Subsequent Judge is tomorrow’s 
Precedent Judge.12 Yet the Subsequent Judge must also ensure that the rule 
she articulates pays appropriate respect to the Precedent Judge’s decision. 
This is the second way in which stare decisis affects the rule of law: By 
giving precedents their due regard as embodying “genuine legal norm[s],” 
Subsequent Judges promote the ideal of a legal order that transcends the 
details of particular disputes and the proclivities of particular judges.13 Legal 
rules become the products not of individuals, but of courts. 
Professor Waldron also considers the rule-of-law effects of a court’s 
decision to overturn a precedent despite its applicability. A legal system that 
accepts some overrulings can remain simpatico with the rule of law, he 
explains, so long as it meets certain conditions.14 In particular, a baseline 
regard for the value of legal constancy must guide the Subsequent Judge 
who is contemplating a departure from precedent. Adopting that perspective 
will lead to the preservation of an essentially stable equilibrium 
notwithstanding occasional incidences of adjudicative change. Recognizing 
the importance of systemic stability is vital in dissuading the Subsequent 
Judge from overruling each and every precedent that she finds 
 
 9. Id. at 20. 
 10. See id. at 12. 
 11. See id. at 21. 
 12. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 571, 573 (1987) (“Today is not 
only yesterday’s tomorrow; it is also tomorrow’s yesterday.”). 
 13. Waldron, supra note 4, at 23. 
 14. See id. at 26. 
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unconvincing.15 Instead, the judge will reserve her overrulings for situations 
in which the need for judicial correction or innovation is pronounced, and 
she will reasonably expect her successors on the bench to do the same. 
II. The Rule-of-Law Case Against Precedent 
Professor Waldron provides a valuable service by applying his 
characteristic rigor to the rule-of-law benefits of precedent. My modest aim 
is to offer some thoughts about how the relationship between precedent and 
the rule of law can run in the opposite direction as well. Professor Waldron 
himself notes this point,16 but given the focus of his project on articulating 
the layers of justification for stare decisis, he understandably devotes less 
attention to the implications of its rule-of-law costs. It will thus be 
instructive to say something more about the rule-of-law case against 
precedent. 
One category of potential rule-of-law costs relates to the dangers of 
stifling the practical effectiveness of reasoned argumentation. There is value 
in a citizen’s power to advocate her interests before governmental bodies 
and to receive an explanation for defeat that is more satisfying than 
unadorned path-dependence.17 That value can find itself at odds with judicial 
deference to precedent. This tension is mitigated to some extent by the 
prevailing American characterization of stare decisis as a rebuttable 
presumption rather than an “inexorable command.”18 Nevertheless, the 
prospect of overruling does not entirely eliminate the rule-of-law concerns 
that may arise from deference to past decisions; the litigant who seeks 
change must still overcome a presumption that her case is a loser. 
A second category of rule-of-law costs involves a court’s choice to 
depart from its best reading of a primary legal source in order to remain 
faithful to precedent. Imagine that you are a Supreme Court justice faced 
with a case involving the right of corporations to make independent 
expenditures on behalf of political candidates.19 Your understanding of the 
Constitution—whether based on its original public meaning, its 
implementation in light of contemporary mores and policy objectives, or 
some other interpretive referent—indicates that corporations do, in fact, 
possess such a right. Yet there is clear precedent to the contrary. You might 
 
 15. See id. at 28. 
 16. See id. at 7–8. 
 17. Cf. Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 Ga. L. Rev. 1, 7–9 
(2008). 
 18. See, e.g., Payne v. Tenn. 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991). 
 19. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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well conclude that the importance of leaving matters settled, as informed by 
the rule-of-law benefits of constancy and stability, overrides the importance 
of applying the Constitution in the manner you would otherwise favor.20 
But note that your decision is not an unmitigated boon for the rule of 
law. By deviating from the reading of the Constitution that you view as most 
compelling, you compromise your solicitude for the Constitution’s role in 
contributing to the “framework of public norms” that “provide a basis of 
legal accountability” for the exercise of governmental power.21 Fidelity to 
judicial precedent sometimes entails the subordination of “fidelity to the 
Constitution.”22 This is no accident; it is inherent in the nature of 
constitutional stare decisis.23 Even so, the fact remains that the principle of 
generality demands regard for judicial precedent and enacted law alike. 
Tilting the scales in favor of the former can undermine the resonance of the 
latter to the detriment of the rule of law.24 
III. Responding to Rule-of-Law Ambivalence 
We can now see that the relationship between stare decisis and the rule 
of law is not all to the good. Deferring to precedent can generate rule-of-law 
costs that may offset the countervailing benefits. What is to be made of the 
resulting tension? 
In doctrinal terms, there are three possible reactions.  First, the rule-of-
law concerns might lead a legal system to consider jettisoning stare decisis 
altogether. Second, judges might attempt to work out the tension on the 
micro level by resolving individual cases in such a way as to promote the 
rule of law. And third, the rule-of-law ambivalence might operate at the 
macro level to influence how much deference judicial precedents receive. I 
discuss each option in turn before suggesting that the third holds the most 
promise. 
A. Jettisoning Stare Decisis 
The most severe response would be to treat rule-of-law concerns as 
undermining the very foundations of stare decisis. That approach strikes me 
 
 20. Not everyone will agree with this claim, especially those who view judicial 
precedents as constitutive of the Constitution. For present purposes, I will merely note that I 
am not entirely convinced by that position. 
 21. Waldron, supra note 4, at 3. 
 22. Id. at 7. 
 23. Id. at 7. 
 24. One might attempt to circumvent this problem by contending that the Constitution 
commands a particular level of respect for precedent. For now, I will simply note that such an 
argument is far from obvious (to me, at least). 
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as an overreaction, in large part because it would sacrifice the potential rule-
of-law benefits that Professor Waldron so effectively describes. Nor is the 
abolition of stare decisis a realistic alternative as a practical matter, at least 
in the foreseeable future. Despite its tendency to come under fire in 
particular cases and to generate disputes about its proper application, the 
abstract notion of stare decisis continues to command significant allegiance 
among most judges and scholars. 
B. Case-by-Case Assessments of the Rule of Law 
Rather than abandoning stare decisis, courts might respond to its rule-of-
law ambivalence at the level of individual cases. The decision of whether to 
defer to precedent would depend on the rule-of-law implications of 
deference in the case at hand. 
A prominent example of this type of analysis comes from Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,25 in which the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed the core holding of Roe v. Wade26 despite equivocation 
about Roe’s soundness as an initial matter. The Casey Court was overtly 
interested in maintaining its institutional legitimacy, which it described as 
intertwined with a robust rule of law. According to the Court, overruling Roe 
would have been perceived as acceding to the demands of citizens who 
urged the decision’s reversal. That perception, in turn, would have exacted a 
serious cost on both “the Court’s legitimacy, and . . . the Nation’s 
commitment to the rule of law.”27  
The problem with the Court’s reasoning is that it is by no means clear 
that the rule of law is best promoted by the perpetuation of arguable error on 
an issue of considerable magnitude, especially when the professed reasons 
for perpetuating the error include the enhancement of the judiciary’s public 
standing. Why didn’t the countervailing rule-of-law costs match, or even 
exceed, the rule-of-law benefits of deference? The Casey Court provided no 
satisfying answer. Moreover, if part of the value of the rule of law comes 
from serving as a source of genuine constraint for governmental actors, it 
seems curious to allow those actors to invoke the rule of law to justify 
protecting their own institutional prerogatives. At the very least, the rule-of-
law effects would require more explication before they could be accepted as 
positive on net. Whether or not there were plausible reasons to retain Roe on 
other grounds, Casey’s undertheorized invocation of the rule of law was 
unpersuasive. 
 
 25. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 26. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 27. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869. 
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Judges also make individualized inquiries into the rule-of-law effects of 
stare decisis where one line of precedent stands in tension with another. In 
such cases, the Subsequent Judge might declare that abandoning the “errant 
precedent” is the outcome best aligned with enhancing jurisprudential 
coherence and promoting the rule of law.28 Yet even where a prior judge 
offers a less-than-compelling basis for distinguishing a precedent, her 
decision still becomes part of the general rule that all future judges on her 
court are jointly charged with respecting and applying. When a Subsequent 
Judge confronts the body of relevant precedents in a future case, she must 
accord respect not only to the original precedent, but also to its intervening 
applications. If the Subsequent Judge chooses to renounce certain precedents 
because she views them as unfaithful to others, her action has both costs and 
benefits for the rule of law. To be sure, her decision may promote the rule of 
law in some measure by enhancing jurisprudential coherence and bringing 
the governing legal norm into closer proximity with the general principle 
that the original precedent embodied. But fidelity to the original precedent 
comes at the expense of fidelity to the intervening applications, and it is 
profoundly difficult to discern whether the rule-of-law benefits of the former 
outweigh the rule-of-law costs of the latter. 
The more basic point is simply to illustrate the challenges of making on-
the-fly determinations about whether deference to precedent supports the 
rule of law in a given case. The rule of law is a valuable principle for 
organizing the operation of a legal system, and it can certainly take some 
options—for instance, resolving a dispute based on personal affinity or 
political preference—off the table in individual cases. But it is an awkward 
tool for determining when to stand by a particular precedent and when to 
depart.  
C. Calibrating the Strength of Deference 
How, then, should the doctrine of stare decisis account for the fact that 
adherence to precedent can both promote and impair the rule of law? I 
suggest a systemic answer, one that goes to heart of the doctrine’s design. 
The interplay between precedent and the rule of law can be channeled into 
the central inquiry of how strong a presumption of deference precedent 
should receive—or, to use the parlance of the Supreme Court, how “special” 
a justification is necessary to warrant a break from the past.29 It is there, in 
determining how powerful the practice of precedent-following ought to be, 
 
 28. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 378 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring). 
 29. See, e.g., id. at 377 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 
U.S. 203, 212 (1984)). 
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that the complicated relationship between stare decisis and the rule of law 
can make a doctrinal difference. 
In any judicial system that treats precedents as deserving of deference 
but ultimately defeasible, there arises a question as to how much overruling 
is optimal. A variety of goals may inform the answer to that question. They 
include avoidance of disruption, consistency of outcomes, and efficiency of 
judicial decisionmaking. And, of course, they include promotion of the rule 
of law. The ambivalent relationship between precedent and the rule of law 
suggests that, to the extent the doctrine of stare decisis is justified by the rule 
of law as opposed to other values, the presumption of deference ought to be 
meaningful but measured. Meaningful deference is necessary to ensure that 
Subsequent Judges respect their predecessors’ decisions as bona fide 
components of the legal order. Likewise, meaningful deference provides a 
safeguard against excessive overrulings, which otherwise might undermine 
stakeholders’ abilities to understand and assimilate legal principles. 
At the same time, maintaining the realistic possibility that erroneous 
decisions will be overruled preserves a role for reasoned argumentation by 
citizens who seek to alter the path of the law. It also provides a mechanism 
for correction when prior judicial pronouncements veer away from the best 
reading of the primary authorities that judges are charged with interpreting. 
Attentiveness to the rule of law can support the retention of some flawed 
precedents on grounds of stare decisis. But it cannot support a presumption 
that is so powerful as to foreclose occasional adoption of new interpretations 
that furnish a better framework for the adjudication of future disputes. 
All of this brings us back to the basic point that it is inaccurate to depict 
every departure from precedent as a dent in the rule of law. A system of 
precedent formulated with the rule of law in mind will contemplate a certain 
amount of overruling. This is not only because other benefits can accompany 
the overruling of precedent. That is surely true, just as it is true that 
overruling precedent can create other costs—such as the disruption of plans 
and understandings—that might militate in favor of deference to past 
decisions. But even if the rule of law were the only value that mattered, it 
would not justify excessive fidelity to flawed precedents. 
Conclusion 
Jeremy Waldron’s discourse on stare decisis and the rule of law is sure 
to become a standard entry in the field, influencing our understanding of the 
core justifications for precedent-based adjudication. I have tried to show that 
from Professor Waldron’s analysis of the rule-of-law benefits of stare 
decisis, it is but a short step to recognize the ramifications of the rule-of-law 
case against precedent. The complexity that characterizes the relationship 
between precedent and the rule of law does not support abandoning stare 
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decisis altogether. But it does suggest that the doctrine’s rule-of-law costs 
must be considered alongside its rule-of-law benefits in striking the 
appropriate balance between past, present, and future. 
 
